I have a broad range of research interests that circle around game theory. They range from Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design over Network Formation and Strategic Communication in Networks to Problems of Incorrect Belief Updating and, finally, good old classic cooperative game theory.

Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design

My coauthors Jean-Jacques Herings and Toygar Kerman and I have investigated how a single sender can persuade an elective to vote in his favor. One of the problems here is that sender-preferred equilibrium has little meaning, as voting games have a myriad of unattractive equilibria: for instance everybody voting in the sender's favor (independent of their belief) is an equilibrium for any voting rule that is not unanimous. Thus, in one working paper we suggest sincere voting as equilibrium refinement, and find the sender's optimal communication strategy.
In another working paper we analyze the higher order information that any communication strategy entails. Here we are interested in the set of belief distributions that can be induced by sender, and the optimal choice if the sender's aim is to minimize receivers' knowledge about each other's information.

Information and Uncertainty in Networks

Interpreting the behavior of others under uncertainty requires the formation of higher order beliefs. In a network setting this is hardly tractable for expected utility maximizers. Things are different, however, if agents are uncertainty averse. In this working paper I investigate protests and social unrest under this assumption and provide a theoretical foundation why revolutions come suddenly, unexpected, and are more likely under repressive regimes.

Incorrect Belief Updating

Why can, despite all effort, racism prevail in police forces around the globe. Manuel Foerster and I provide an answer in this working paper.

Cooperative Game Theory

This is where I have started my academic career. I have worked and still work on coalition formation; Hans Peters and I have proposed new power indices for structures that allow much more detailed descriptions of the world than simpile games; and with Shiran Rachmilevitch, I have proposed several bargaining solutions, using new axioms.

On the subsequent sites you can find my working papers and publications.

More details are available on my Google Scholar Profile.